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Conducting reputation management is very important for
Internet of vehicles. However, most of the existing researches
evaluate the effectiveness of their schemes with settled attack-
ing behaviors in their simulation which cannot represent the
scenarios in reality. In this paper, we propose to consider
dynamical and diversity attacking strategies in the simulation
of reputation management scheme evaluation. To that end, we
apply evolutionary game theory to model the evolution process of
malicious users’ attacking strategies, and discuss the methodology
of the evaluation simulations. We further apply our evaluation
method to a reputation management scheme with multiple utility
functions, and discuss the evaluation results. The results indicate
that our evaluation method is able to depict the evolving process
of the dynamic attacking strategies in a vehicular network, and
the final state of the simulation could be used to quantify the
protection effectiveness of the reputation management scheme.
Index Terms—reputation management scheme, Internet of ve-
hicles, evolutionary game theory, malicious users, utility function
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of mobile Internet gives us an oppor-
tunity to enjoy a better life when traveling with vehicles. With
on board units (e.g. smart phones), vehicles are able to share
information over the Internet at real time, and learn bigger vi-
sions all over the road map to make better travelling decisions.
Within the last few years, a bunch of business has arisen for
intelligent traveling, e.g. intelligent traffic information service
[1] [2], taxi booking apps [3], and unmanned vehicles [4] [5].
However, the growing business of intelligent traveling also
brings growing security problems since malicious behaviors
are turning to be more threatening. In many fields, different
problems and related research results are proposed. Such as
the disclosure of privacy data [6] [7], the real-time nature of
event data [8], the attack against peer-to-peer networks [9] and
detection or forensics of these attacks [10] [11] [12], etc. One
of the biggest problems for the business runner is to identify
the malicious (or bad) users of the intelligent service users. For
example, in a traffic information service, when the malicious
vehicles broadcast fraud messages, the other vehicle would be
misled by the fraud message. In a taxi booking application,
if an application driver always refuses to serve for assigned
orders, the passengers of such orders would definitely have
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bad experience on such taxi booking applications. Herein,
a reputation management scheme of such business over the
Internet of vehicles is very important for improving its service
quality and service experience.
The reputation management scheme (also noted as trust
model) of vehicular networks has been extensively studied
within the last decade [13]. Generally, a reputation manage-
ment method sets up a global or private credit for each entity,
data, or both. It also adjusts the credit according to the dynamic
evaluation of the entity or data by punishing the misbehaviors
[14] [15]. When it comes to the evaluation of the effectiveness
of a trust model, the behavior of the attackers are always
predefined, and all attackers act in the same way, e.g. “In
our experiments, the sender weight factor is set to 2 to double
the weight of a sender in message evaluation” [16]. As an
experiment simulation for qualitative analysis, we think this
kind of assumption is okay. However, we doubt the rationality
of such assumptions when it comes to the practical use.
First, due to the different backgrounds and habits, the
attackers are more likely to take different attacking strategies
which leads to the attacking behaviors varying in a wide range,
and happening simultaneously. Therein, the attackers in the
same simulation should take various actions to be closer to
the de facto practice.
Second, we should not assume all attackers are wise enough
to attack. Since a malicious user may be blind to the overall
reputation management scheme and the behaviors of the other
users in the same intelligent travelling service, it is really
hard to make a smart choice among all the possible attacking
strategies. In a real case, we believe the story is like this: the
original attacking plan is not profitable enough to the attacker
and the attacker learns from the previous experience according
to the punishment of the vehicular network and improves their
plan to attack wisely.
According to the above discussion, the simulation of a
reputation management scheme evaluation should involve ma-
licious vehicles with a set of dynamic and diverse strategies,
and the current common practice of reputation management
scheme evaluation still has a long way to the end of practical
use. To fill the gap between the industrial requirements and
research output, we propose to apply evolutionary game theory
in the evaluation simulation of a reputation management
scheme of vehicular.
Our idea is to simulate the strategy selections of the
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2malicious vehicles in the evaluation process following the
evolutionary game mode. We initialize the population of
malicious vehicles with randomly selected strategies in a wide
range, and give the malicious vehicles opportunities to evolve
by making a heuristic change according to the feedback of the
reputation system. In general, the malicious vehicles would
converge to a final state which is an optimal choice for all.
Our contribution in this paper include 3 folds:
1) We take a first step for the simulation that attackers
in reputation management system of a vehicular network
would take diverse and dynamic strategies, which provides an
evaluation scenario much closer to the real world, and enables
the research community to conduct systematically and evaluate
a reputation management scheme.
2) We propose to apply evolutionary game theory in the
evaluation process of reputation management schemes, and
discuss the detailed simulation scenarios of game modeling.
3) We apply our evolutionary game method to an example
reputation management scheme with various attacking tar-
gets. The evaluation results suggests that our method is able
to depict a detailed evolution process. Since the evolution
converges to the state that all malicious entities get to its
optimal strategies, our evolutionary game method is also able
to provide a quantitative evaluation about the effectiveness of
a reputation management scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as following. First, we
introduce the related works in Section 2. Then we formally
define our problem in Section 3 and describe our evolutionary
game model and evolution progress together with a running
example in Section 4. In Section 5, we apply our evaluation
model on our example reputation method to describe its
effectiveness in reality. Finally, we conclude our paper with
feature works in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Problems in VANET and Trust Models
VANET can be built on V2V and V2I networks, most
of which use wireless communication technology such as
WiMAX or IEEE 802.11p [17]. The research community has
long noticed possible security issues in VANET, and [18]
[19] has investigated and summarized these security issues.
The trust problem, how to minimize the damage caused by
false information transmitted by dishonest communications
entities, has become the focus of research. The work related
to solving the trust problem has been fully surveyed in [14]
[15]. Moreover, [20] has researched and summarized the trust
models in VANET. The trust models in VANET can be
divided into three categories: entity-oriented and data-oriented,
in addition to some work that combines the characteristics of
both types of models.
In the entity-oriented models, [21] [22] evaluates the trust
of the entity. The environmental factors, other entities that
have communicated with the entity, and the historical behavior
of the entity all have an impact on its trust evaluation. As
for the data-oriented model [23], instead of the entity itself,
the data sent by the entity is given credibility. By defining
an appropriate trust metric, an entity does not focus on other
entities, but rather measures the level of trust in the data it
receives.
There are still some problems with these two models. Entity-
oriented models are sensitive to the number of sources of
information. The trust relationship between entities under the
data-oriented model will never change - this is the inefficient
[20]. [24] was proposed to overcome these problems. Under
the model, the entity simultaneously measures the credibility
of the received data and the trust evaluation of the communi-
cation opponents from other entities. Several papers [25] [26]
[27] [28] [29] have studied related IoT security issues.
B. Evolutionary Game Theory
At the beginning of game theory, it was a branch of
mathematics in service economics [30]. However, with the de-
velopment of game theory, computer science and engineering
have gradually begun to apply game theory to solve problems.
[31] summarizes the existing game theory application results
in the field of network security and proposes a classification
method. [32] investigates the existing game theory application
results in the field of wireless network engineering. Especially
on the issue of distributed denial of service attacks, game
theory has been widely used [33] [34] [35].
The solution under the traditional game theory framework,
Nash equilibrium [36], has a strong assumption: all game
players are absolutely rational. Researchers have recognized
this problem for years and tried to overcome [37] [38]. In the
field of information security, [39] proposes the two charac-
teristics of bounded rationality and repeated game in network
confrontation game, which is the premise of evolutionary game
theory. On this basis, the application of evolutionary game
theory in economics and networks is comparatively studied.
In the field of wireless network engineering, [40] proposes
a dynamic network selection scheme based on evolutionary
game theory under heterogeneous networks.
Due to the convergence of evolutionary game theory and
VANET, there have been some research results in this field.
[41] establishes an evolutionary game model for VANET and
studies the issue of incentive cooperation in VANET. They
believe that the cooperative behavior in VANET will not
spread unconditionally. And [42] also studied the cooperative
behavior in VANET. They found through simulation of the
evolutionary game model that the cooperation rate is related
to the energy consumption factor. And compared to all ve-
hicles choose cooperation, a certain proportion of partners
can achieve the same information dissemination effect, while
saving some bandwidth. [43] proposes a routing algorithm
based on evolutionary game theory to solve the selfish problem
in VANET. [44] studied the security protection scheme in
VANET under the framework of evolutionary game theory,
and established a generalized evolutionary game model with
versatility. They use threats posed by malicious attackers as
input to optimize the deployment of the security protection
scheme. [45] proposes an evolutionary game model for the
RSU bandwidth resource competition in V2I networks, and
its evolutionarily stable strategy is considered to be the best
solution for this competition. They also simulated evolutionary
3games, showing the evolutionary process and the impact of
evolutionarily stable strategy on network utilization efficiency.
Our work is not to propose a new trust management model
or security protection scheme, but to find a solution that can
effectively and rationally evaluate a trust management model
under the framework of evolutionary game theory.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In general, our goal is to find the most effective protec-
tion solution deployment decision for fraud in the connected
vehicles network. In this part of the following, we will use
the ordinary V2I network and a simple reputation calculation
model as the research object to illustrate the basic assumptions
and problems.
A. V2I Network
In our V2I network, vehicles communicate with the central
server to exchange traffic event messages. These traffic events
are events that occur randomly on the road network that may
affect the vehicle’s travel (such as traffic jams, road con-
struction, traffic accidents, and road conditions, etc.). Vehicles
traveling on the road have the ability to sense these traffic
events. Once the vehicle senses the presence of a traffic event,
it can form an event message and submit it to the central server.
The central server is responsible for managing the vehicle
information and the messages they submit. In addition, the
central server also broadcasts a list of traffic events on the
road network to the vehicle to assist in driving. Finally, the
number of vehicles traveling on this road network can vary
from moment to moment. In other words, new vehicles can
be added to the network at any time, and vehicles can leave
the network at any time. However, we assume that the total
number of vehicles traveling on the road network is relatively
stable over a certain period of time. Similarly, the proportion
of dishonest vehicles in the overall vehicle is relatively stable.
B. Deceptive Behavior
As we mentioned in the first (second) section, deceptive
behavior can have a negative impact on this connected vehicles
network system. Specifically, deception refers to a dishonest
vehicle submitting its counterfeit false (non-existent) traffic
event message during the driving process. The strength of
submitting false messages can be called deception intensity.
We define this as the average rate at which dishonest vehicles
submit false traffic event messages to the central server. That
is, the number of false traffic events messages submitted to the
central server per unit time. For example, in hours, a dishonest
vehicle submits ten false traffic events messages to the central
service within one hour, and the deception intensity is ten.
In this paper, we take 5000 seconds as a unit of time. The
deception intensity of dishonest vehicles is:
fr ∈ {x | 1 ≤ x ≤ 100, x ∈ Z}
Obviously, for a single dishonest vehicle, choosing a dif-
ferent level of deception intensity can have varying degrees
of negative impact on the system. For the entire dishonest
vehicles with uncertain totals in the network, regardless of
whether they are connected, they can choose different decep-
tion intensity at the same time. Different distribution of popu-
lation with different deception intensity make different overall
negative impact on the system. In addition, the distribution of
deception intensity can even change at any time. We cannot
simply assume that dishonest vehicles are unanalyzable. As
time progresses, dishonest vehicles should generally be able
to change the distribution of deception intensity in order to
achieve greater negative impact.
C. Trust Management Model
This paper takes a simple trust management calculation
model we designed as a research object, which combines
the characteristics of both entity-oriented and data-oriented
models. Under this model, vehicles and traffic event messages
have their own reputation values.
For the reputation value of the vehicle, the system gives
each vehicle in the network a reputation value. If the vehicle’s
reputation value drops to zero, then the vehicle will be judged
to be dishonest by the system. Dishonest vehicles will be re-
moved from the network. As for the reputation value of traffic
event messages. When a traffic event message is submitted, the
system assigns the reputation value of its submitted vehicle to
the traffic event message as an initial value. If the reputation
value of the traffic event message becomes zero, the message
is determined to be a false message. False messages will be
removed from the broadcast list.
In terms of reputation calculation for a traffic event message,
whenever the system receives a report that does not exist, the
reputation value of the message is reduced by one unit. And
for a vehicle, whenever a traffic event message submitted by
it is removed, the system will perform a punitive reduction on
the reputation value of the vehicle.
Obviously, there are some parameters that need to be preset
when deploying such a protection scheme. The method of
penalizing vehicle reputation values (such as linear decline,
exponential decline, and logarithmic decline, etc.) is a typical
option. The protection effect produced by choosing different
punishment methods is naturally different.
D. Summary
In summary, we found that there are some options in the
deception of this connected vehicles network that can affect
the outcome where these choices can all be dynamic. For the
distribution of deception intensity in the population, we aim to
analyze the law of change and find the optimal distribution and
its maximum benefit (for dishonest groups). On this basis, we
will further analyze the impact of different trust management
model parameters on these optimal distributions and maximum
benefits. This indicates the optimal deployment decision for
the protection scheme.
IV. EVOLUTIONARY GAME
Evolutionary games occur between individuals in the pop-
ulation. At a point in time, the distribution of decisions on
4the population is called a state. The evolutionary game is a
dynamic system in the mathematical sense. The object of its
study is the development of the trajectory of this state in the
state space, which is characterized by a differential equation.
This differential equation is called the replicator equation
in the evolutionary game. According to evolutionary game
theory, there are steady states in the dynamic system [46].
These steady states are called evolutionary stability strategies
or evolutionarily stable sets as solutions to evolutionary games.
Often these evolutionary steady states will bring higher utility
to the overall population. In this section, we will first introduce
our evolutionary game model through the four elements of
evolutionary games. We will then explain the details of the
evolution process.
A. Game Definition
This evolutionary game can be formalized as a four-tuple:
(P, S,At, U).
1) P represents the player in the game. For the problem of
deceiving in the connected vehicles network, we define
the player of the evolutionary game as a whole popu-
lation of dishonest vehicles. In all dishonest vehicles,
the decision of every dishonest vehicle is influenced by
other dishonest vehicles. As we mentioned in the third
section, the total number of players is macroscopically
stable.
2) S represents the player’s strategic space. The strategy
for dishonest vehicles is the deception intensity fr we
mentioned in the third part. That means the strategic
space S is a discrete collection of 100 elements.
S = {x | 1 ≤ x ≤ 100, x ∈ Z}
3) At represents the distribution of decisions in the pop-
ulation at time t. Different individuals in the popula-
tion can choose different strategies, and all individuals
who choose the same strategy constitute the group that
chooses the strategy. The proportion distribution of all
groups in the population as an overall decision. This
overall strategic space is the state space of the evolu-
tionary game dynamic system. The individual’s strategic
space composition determines that the state space of the
evolutionary game dynamic system is a regular simplex
in 100-dimensional Euclidean space.
At ∈ {(a1, a2, · · · , ai, · · · , a100) | ai ∈ [0, 1],Σai = 1}
4) U represents the individual’s utility function. We define
it as the sum of the durations of all false event messages
submitted by the vehicle. The duration of the message
represents the time elapsed since the message was sub-
mitted to be removed. On the definition of individual
utility, there is further utility of the group Ui. It can be
simply defined as the sum of individual utility in the
group whose decision is i.
B. Evolution Process
In nature, the evolution of a population is reflected in
the process of reproduction and natural selection. In our
evolutionary game model, natural selection is reflected in the
fact that dishonest vehicles are removed from the network by
the system as dishonest. And reproduction is reflected in the
fact that when the vehicle is removed from the network in the
population, we call it elimination, the new vehicle will join the
population and enter the network. The practical significance
of this is that the owner of a dishonest vehicle may re-enter
the network and continue to attack by replacing his account
on the network.
Evolution takes place on the strategic choice of newly joined
vehicles. According to our replicator equation [47]:
a˙ = ai[Ui −
100∑
j=1
ajUj ]
The algorithm for the newly joined vehicle selection strategy
is as follows:
Algorithm 1 Strategy selection algorithm
observe utility Ulist for all strategy
observe Uoverall =
∑100
j=1 ajUj
for all Ui ∈ Ulist do
listpredominant ← decisoni
decison← RandomSelect(listpredominant)
end for
Join the group and execute the attack strategy
The above algorithm assumes that dishonest vehicles can
always choose a better strategy. It may be an overestimation
of the attacker in the actual scene. In this regard, we can
define the evolution ability factor as an accuracy that affects
the attacker’s choice of a new strategy. This factor can be
affected by many factors, such as the attacker’s analytical
ability, the attacker’s intelligence gathering ability, the degree
of information exchange between a particular attacker and
other attackers and whether there is a cooperative relationship
between the attackers. When the evolution ability factor is 1,
the above algorithm is established. This represents one of the
worst situations in both theoretical and practical scenarios.
C. Evolution Example
Next, we use an evolutionary game on a simple 3D strategy
space as an example to illustrate the evolution of the state of
evolution. Let us assume a scenario like this:
• The total number of dishonest vehicles is 100
• The initial state of dishonest vehicles, ie the population
strategy distribution in the population, as shown in figure
1, the three strategies are 10, 20, 30 in order.
As time goes by, vehicles will gradually be removed. At
this point, the newly joined vehicles will need to re-select
their strategy. As shown in the table 1, some vehicles in the
Strategy 10 group were eliminated between time 1004 and
1005. New vehicles want to join the network to continue the
attack. These new vehicles need to choose their own attack
strategy according to the strategy selection algorithm. At this
time, only the utility of Strategy 20 and Strategy 30 (16171
and 15326) is higher than the overall utility (13992.247).
5Fig. 1: The status space and initial status
As a result, these new vehicles have chosen from these two
strategies. Note that the new vehicle does not directly select
the strategy of the most effective group. This is because in
evolution, the utility of the group is related to the population.
This means even if the group’s utility is the highest, it does not
mean that the corresponding strategy is the best. It is extremely
difficult for individuals to choose the best strategy without
collusion.
Time Distribution in population Utility of groups Overall utility
1004 0.19, 0.47, 0.24 5356, 16142, 15319 13645.489
1005 0.16, 0.48, 0.25 5372, 16171, 15326 13992.247
1006 0.11, 0.49, 0.29 5383, 16200, 15333 14580.562
TABLE I: Group distribution status and utility between time
1004 and 1006
In the long run, the overall strategic distribution of the group
will start from the initial state, draw an evolutionary trajectory
in the state space, and finally stabilize in the evolutionary
stable state, as shown in the figure 2.
Fig. 2: Evolutionary trajectory
V. EVALUATION
In this section we will show some simulations of the
aforementioned evolutionary game. The simulation will mainly
show the evolutionary process and steady state under different
protection scheme parameter settings. In addition, we will use
the average growth rate of overall utility as a measure to show
the level of damage that dishonest vehicles can cause to the
network in a steady state of different scenarios. The higher the
average growth rate, the more dishonest vehicles can have a
greater negative impact on the network at this moment.
A. Experiment Setup
Our road network, including vehicles and events, is illus-
trated in Figure 3. We simulate the driving process of the
vehicle in the form of time slicing. The parameters in the
entire road network of the road are as follows:
• The size of the road network is 87×87 blocks. The length
of the block is 1km, and the road network size without
road width is 87× 87 = 7569km2
• The vehicle travels at a constant speed of 36km/h.
Driving mode is random walk, but will not turn around
• The total number of vehicles is 100, 000
• Among them, dishonest vehicles account for one thou-
sandth, that is, 100 vehicles
Fig. 3: Road network diagram
In addition to all of the following simulations, the initial
strategic choices for the 100 dishonest vehicles were evenly
distributed. That is to say, 100 vehicles have selected the
deception intensity of 1 unit to 100 units as their initial
decision.
Finally, we use one of the parameters in the protection
scheme, the initial reputation value assigned to the vehicle,
as a strategy for the trust management model. We will also
observe the effects of different parameters on the evolutionary
process.
6(a) Initial reputation value is 1. The pure strat-
egy in steady state is strategy 97
(b) Initial reputation value is 5. The pure strat-
egy in steady state is strategy 93
(c) Initial reputation value is 10. The pure
strategy in steady state is strategy 91
Fig. 4: Changes in population strategy distribution over time in different environments
Fig. 5: The average growth rate of overall utility over time
Fig. 6: The average growth rate of overall utility over time, with initial reputation value is 10.
7B. Simulation
Figure 4 shows the population strategy distribution over
time under three different trust management model settings.
Lines drawn by different colors represent different strategic
groups. As we mentioned earlier, 100 dishonest vehicles have
chosen a deception intensity of 1 to 100 units as an attack
strategy. A total of 100 strategies formed 100 groups. We
can observe that during the evolution process, some groups
disappeared because their utility could not keep up with the
overall average. For example, in the vicinity of the 120th time
unit in Figure 4.a, the group that selected Strategy 63 began
to die out. Until the 150th time unit, this group eventually
became extinct. On the contrary, other groups have grown
stronger due to however more efficient their output may be.
For example, in Figure 4.a, the size of the group that selected
Strategy 97 is constantly expanding. Eventually it began to
replace the group that selected Strategy 86 in the vicinity of
the 175th time unit and thus rose sharply. In the end, the
population strategy distribution tends to be a stable state of
pure strategy. In Figure 4.a, the pure strategy in this steady
state is Strategy 97. We observed that the population of this
group was oscillating and less than 100 in steady state. This
is because this stability is dynamic. Dishonest vehicles in the
network are submitting false event messages all the time, and
the system is also removing the discredited vehicles identified
from the network all the time. In this way, the dishonest
vehicles in the group will die at any time and will be added
at any time. But supplements always lag behind death. This
causes the group’s population to always oscillate below 100
under steady state conditions.
Compared with different environments, that is, different pro-
tection scheme deployment strategies, the final pure strategy
stable state is generally within a more aggressive range. But
obviously, their convergence time is not the same. Simply
put, the higher the system’s tolerance for errors, the longer
it takes to converge. In our opinion, this is because the high
tolerance of the system leads to a decline in the speed of group
replacement. In particular, high tolerance results in a single
dishonest vehicle being able to survive longer in the network.
Groups are more likely to maintain their decisions. Conversely,
low tolerance makes dishonest vehicles removed faster. Groups
are replaced more frequently. Naturally, the time it takes for
evolution to reach stability is shorter. This also explains the
reason why the extremely conservative strategy groups in
Figure 4 can survive for a long time, and their extremely
conservative strategies make them difficult to replace.
As we mentioned before, The average growth rate of overall
utility is used to assess the ability of dishonest vehicles to
cause damage to the network as a whole. Figure 5 shows
the changes in network damage levels over time by dishonest
vehicles. As the evolution progressed, the overall level of
damage done to the network gradually increased. This value
also tends to stabilize when the population strategy distribution
is finally stable. Compare the level of damage that can be
caused by the final stable in different environments. Obviously,
for this simple trust management model, higher the system’s
tolerance for errors, the higher the level of damage that
dishonest vehicles cause to the network.
Figure 6 shows the gap in the overall utility of the group
decision-making method under the guidance of evolutionary
games and the completely static decision-making method.
The gap between the two is very obvious. Compared to the
evolutionary game method, the static attack strategy seems to
be unsuccessful. From the beginning to the end, the overall
utility has barely increased.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss the feasibility of an applied
scenario with dynamic and diverse attacking strategies in
the evaluation of reputation management schemes of Internet
of Vehicles. To that end, we propose an evolutionary game
theory based solution which initializes the attacking plans
with random choice, and conducts attacking plans evolution
with detailed simulation consideration. With application on
our example reputation management system, we manage to
depict the evolution process of the attacking scenarios which
converges to a situation that most of the malicious vehicles
finally get to its optimal choice, and simulation result could
also be used to quantify the effectiveness of a reputation
management scheme of a vehicular network.
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